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Although fluctuating in intensity, debates about the role of the state remain funda-mental to strategies for rural develop-
ment and poverty reduction. Under structural 
adjustment African states were scaled back to 
play a minimalist public goods provider role, 
motivated in large part by the weakness and 
over-extension of the state prior to that. Whilst 
there is now broad recognition that a more 
activist, coordinating role is required to stimu-
late market development (World Bank, 1997, 
Dorward et.al. 2004), this places extra demands 
on the capacity of the state. Meanwhile, most 
African states are almost two decades into a 
transition to democracy. Whilst the median voter 
in most of these states is rural and poor, it 
remains unclear as to whether democratic poli-
tics can generate the incentives for the creation 
of “developmental” states that will serve the 
needs of such voters.
Smallholder agriculture has a particular role 
to play in growth and poverty reduction in 
Africa. In Maputo in 2003 African leaders pledged 
to allocate 10% of their national budgets to 
agricultural development following years of 
crisis and neglect. This policy brief draws on 
research in seven districts of Kenya (Eldoret 
West, Mwingi, Nyeri South and Rachuonyo) and 
Malawi (Dedza, Rumphi and Thyolo), conducted 
during 2007-09, that examined the role and 
performance of the Ministry of Agriculture at 
district level, using interviews with key infor-
mants and focus group discussions. The research 
explored stakeholders’ views as to the role that 
the ministries should be playing in different 
contexts, what they actually do and why, and 
what factors impede the performance of their 
roles. The full case study reports can be found 
at www.future-agriculture.org.
Performance of Ministries of 
Agriculture: Increasing Resource 
Allocation … 
In all seven studied districts, farmers’ percep-
tions of the performance of the Ministry of 
Agriculture over time are dominated by national 
policy trends and the priority that national 
leaders give to agriculture. These factors have 
determined the volume of resources flowing to 
the ministry offices at district and sub-district 
levels. By contrast, none of the initiatives to 
improve the efficiency with which the ministry 
uses these resources at local level have made 
sufficient difference to service delivery to be 
commented upon within focus groups1. 
Under their first presidents, both countries 
are considered to have pursued reasonably 
effective policies for agricultural and rural devel-
opment (World Bank 1981). Both then entered 
a period of increasing corruption and neglect 
of agricultural development. When Presidents 
Kibaki (December 2002) and Mutharika (June 
2004) came to power, both saw the opportunity 
to gain popularity by delivering improved public 
service delivery, including in agriculture. In both 
Malawi and Kenya the budgets available to 
ministries of agriculture and rural development 
have increased under the current presidencies. 
This has translated into extra resources at district 
level, although a large share of the additional 
resources received at district level in Malawi has 
been absorbed in the administrative overheads 
for the subsidy programme.  In Kenya much of 
the credit for the increased resource flow can 
be given to a small group of influential techno-
crats in Nairobi, who made the case for renewed 
investment in agricultural services. Latterly, 
Minister Ruto has also pushed for a higher 
budget share for the agricultural sector, drawing 
on the 2003 Maputo Declaration figure of 10%, 
a stance that may reflect broader political 
ambitions.  
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… but Co-existing with 
Considerable Ineﬃ  ciency
van de Walle (2001) describes African states as 
‘neo-patrimonial’, with legal-rational elements 
(interested in state building) in tension with the 
exigencies of patronage politics. In Kenya the 
infl uence of patronage politics, reducing the 
effi  ciency with which additional resources are 
used by the Ministry of Agriculture, can be 
clearly seen. This is evidenced most clearly by 
the proliferation of so-called agriculture sector 
ministries in the country since the advent of 
coalition government under President Kibaki in 
2002-03. As more coalition partners have 
needed to be rewarded with ministerial posi-
tions, the number of such ministries has risen 
to nine, through a series of sub-divisions. This 
immediately creates a need to coordinate activi-
ties at district level. Fortunately, local staff  know 
each other and often remain in adjacent offi  ces, 
which facilitates coordination. Coordination is 
also sometimes enforced by resource shortages, 
with, for example, one offi  ce having a vehicle 
but no driver and their neighbours having the 
opposite. However, the allocation of resources 
across ministries was clearly sub-optimal in all 
the studied districts, given local agro-ecological 
conditions - the result of multiple, independent 
planning processes. 
More recently, there has also been a prolifera-
tion of districts within Kenya, with many former 
divisions being upgraded to district status. This 
is popular with residents (for status reasons) and 
may help secure increased resource fl ows under 
the anticipated new constitution. However, in 
the short term it spreads resources even more 
thinly, as additional district-level posts are 
created, pulling staff  away from the extension 
frontline. In Malawi, as a result of the political 
fallout between Mutharika and the party that 
ushered him into the presidency, the subsidy 
programme has been greatly used as a tool for 
building support for his own political party. 
Evidence suggests that district allocations for 
the fertiliser subsidy programme favoured those 
districts considered strategically important in 
shoring up support for the president’s party. In 
these districts, a disproportionate share of 
increased resource flow has invariably been 
absorbed in the administration of the subsidy 
programme.
Within the Ministry of Agriculture in Kenya 
allocation of basic staff  and fi nancial resources 
is fairly even across districts. In 2006 both Nyeri 
South and Eldoret North, historically favoured 
districts, lost signifi cant numbers of staff  in a 
nationwide redistribution (referred to within 
these districts as the “tsunami”). This is evidence 
of the eff orts of technocrats within the ministry 
to build even state capacity across the country. 
By contrast, in Malawi there were three times 
as many offi  cers of graduate level in Rumphi 
district Ministry of Agriculture offi  ce as in the 
other two districts combined. We have not 
obtained consolidated figures for project 
resources going into the studied districts, but 
there is a perception in both countries that 
inequalities in resource access across districts 
comes not so much from the distribution of the 
basic ministry budgets as from the ability of 
some districts (with connections to Minister or 
President, for example) to capture a dispropor-
tionate share of extraordinary resources from 
donor projects or special government 
programmes. 
When one looks within the budget of a 
Ministry of Agriculture district offi  ce in either 
country, several sources of inefficiency are 
apparent. The fi rst is the well-known imbalance 
in the budget share going to salaries (staff  are 
diffi  cult to fi re) as opposed to operational expen-
diture. One manifestation of this in all districts 
is the inadequate provision of transport to get 
staff  based in offi  ces out into the fi eld. This is 
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particularly unfortunate given that the second 
big imbalance is between office-based and 
frontline staff. For example, in Rachuonyo in 
2007 there were 31 office-based professional 
staff and nine administrative staff to “support” 
seven frontline extension workers, whilst 31 
divisions lacked a frontline extension worker2. 
This situation, mirrored to a greater or lesser 
extent in all the other districts, is the result of a 
long-term moratorium on new hiring, combined 
with efforts to upgrade the training of existing 
staff and the reward for higher qualifications 
being to occupy an office-based position (in 
Kenya meaning either divisional or district 
level).
The scarcity of frontline staff is particularly 
remarked by farmers, who still believe that 
extension staff should be engaged in visiting 
farmers in their homes and fields. Moreover, the 
rigid equation of grade with formal training is 
a major cause of demoralisation amongst 
remaining front-line extension staff, some of 
whom have remained at the same grade for 
10-20 years due to lack of training opportunities. 
In addition to modest pay, these staff feel that 
there is no reward for additional effort in getting 
out and serving farmers. A further complaint in 
both countries is that bicycle allowances for 
frontline staff (to compensate them for wear and 
tear when using their own bicycles for work 
business) are either woefully inadequate 
(Malawi) or have been abandoned altogether 
(Kenya). 
In Kenya performance contracts have been 
introduced to try to raise the work rate of staff 
at all levels. Frontline staff report that these have 
been used to increase the number of farmer 
contacts per month considerably over the past 
decade. However, we cannot confirm whether 
the real increase is as great as that reported. 
Some farmers (especially those identified by 
extension staff!) did comment upon improved 
extension effort in recent years, but many are 
yet to experience extension contact with any 
regularity. In Malawi, meanwhile, complaints 
that poorly paid and resourced extension staff 
have “gone native”, spend more time on their 
own fields than on their official duties and prin-
cipally serve as implementing consultants for 
NGO programmes to earn extra remuneration 
featured prominently in interviews. 
The improvement in resource flow to 
Ministries of Agriculture in both countries 
notwithstanding, these experiences demon-
strate that most of the longer-standing sources 
of inefficiencies have not been addressed. The 
initiatives taken in Kenya, introducing perfor-
mance based contracts and relocating personnel 
across districts are commendable, but do not 
go far enough to address the underlying 
systemic and structural sources of inefficiencies 
that have impeded improved performance. 
These relate in particular to the procedures for 
hiring, promoting and firing staff that are deeply 
embedded in the way the national civil service 
operates.
Political Incentives for Building 
State Capacity for Service Delivery
The mixed picture of increased aggregate 
resources, but considerable inefficiency in the 
way in which available resources are used, high-
lights the question of the incentives for 
improving state performance, in agriculture or 
elsewhere, under a democratic political regime. 
Both Presidents Kibaki and Mutharika saw an 
opportunity to gain popularity by delivering 
improved public service delivery, including in 
agriculture. However, the example of the prolif-
eration of agriculture sector ministries in Kenya 
shows that efficiency in service delivery was not 
an overriding policy objective. Indeed, both 
presidents have sought quick wins in service 
delivery, not fundamental reform of their state 
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apparatus so as to achieve long-term, sustained 
improvements in service. These quick wins were 
sought through an initial resource injection 
(including salary increases), plus additional 
upward accountability for performance by 
ministry staff  (through performance contracts 
in Kenya and greater reporting requirements 
for senior personnel in Malawi). The immediate 
objective was to create an impression of prog-
ress in time for the president’s re-election 
campaign. Both elements could gradually be 
relaxed or reversed during the president’s 
second term, as neither president has the oppor-
tunity of standing for further re-election. 
By contrast, building state capacity is a long-
term agenda that involves the tackling of intrac-
table systemic problems. For example, changing 
how the performance of civil servants (such as 
Ministry of Agriculture offi  cials in district offi  ces) 
is monitored and rewarded requires the forging 
of a policy consensus, the passage of any neces-
sary legislation, then implementation of the new 
procedures, before any change in behaviour is 
observed. Such reforms can expect immediate 
opposition, even if only from bureaucratic 
vested interests3, whilst politically, any dividends 
will only be reaped by a president’s second term 
(at the earliest), which is really too late! Indeed, 
classic second term behaviour by a president 
who cannot himself stand for offi  ce again is to 
fi ll senior government positions with his own 
people (his legacy to them), and this may be 
made more difficult by comprehensive civil 
service reform. Thus, competitive electoral poli-
tics alone is unlikely to produce the incentives 
for the creation of “developmental” states. 
Instead, in countries such as Kenya and Malawi, 
a national consensus on the importance of state 
building may be required, so that any president 
and party that comes to power continues the 
agreed work. Such a consensus does not exist 
in either Kenya or Malawi, not least because 
there is little constructive dialogue on long-term 
policy issues between government, opposition 
and civil society. 
Technocratic Attempts to Enhance 
Eﬃ  ciency: Lacking Political Will?
These arguments provide a context for exam-
ining measures introduced to improve the effi  -
ciency with which ministries of agriculture in 
Kenya and Malawi use resources at local level. 
As already noted, none of these has had a suffi  -
cient impact to be remarked upon by farmer 
focus groups charting trends in ministry perfor-
mance in their district over time. A common 
element is that these measures have been 
promoted by donor programmes, with limited 
domestic championing.
In both countries there have been moves 
towards a more “demand-driven” approach to 
extension in recent years4. This is seen by propo-
nents (including sympathetic local technocrats) 
as a half-way house to either privatisation (fully 
private for those who can aff ord it; NGO provi-
sion for those who cannot) and/or decentralisa-
tion of service provision. It has proceeded 
furthest in veterinary services, due both to the 
nature of curative services plus the fact that 
livestock farmers are considered better off  than 
average. The district case studies suggest that 
the “demand-driven” approach is unpopular 
with farmers in both countries. In Kenya exten-
sion staff  do seem to make themselves available 
(at specifi c points within a given location at a 
given time each week) for farmers to seek their 
advice. They like the fact that they are now 
dealing primarily with motivated clients, but 
recognise that more needs to be done to sensi-
tise other farmers to the principles of the new 
approach. In Malawi the roll-out of the new 
approach was supposed to be preceded by the 
establishment of stakeholder panels (at district, 
area and village level) for both sensitisation and 
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expression of demand. However, none is in place 
in any of the three studied districts. The tech-
nocratic vision of stakeholder panels was 
completely overshadowed by the success of the 
fertilizer programme, which enjoys strong 
backing at the highest political and policy levels. 
The narrative of the programme’s success, which 
has seen the state act largely alone, effectively 
crowded out any space for alternative visions 
for improving performance of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.
The view of other stakeholders in Malawi is 
that Ministry officials have interpreted the 
“demand-driven” approach as an excuse for not 
getting out to farmers, because the latter have 
not demanded advice. In both countries farmers 
seem to resent the fact that they have to find 
and approach an extension worker, when their 
view is that extension staff should be visiting 
them in their fields5. Meanwhile, there is little 
evidence that the “demand-driven” approach 
will become a stepping stone to the privatisation 
of extension services. Instead, it could simply 
be a way by which extension services manage 
the problem of excess demand for extension 
whilst they remain extremely resource 
constrained.
Finally, decentralisation of extension service 
provision, as part of a more fundamental reform 
of local government administration, is seen as 
a promising policy option amongst some in the 
international community. In Malawi decentrali-
sation has been promoted by donors such as 
UNDP, NORAD and GTZ since the early 1990s, 
but implementation of the decentralisation 
programme has been stalled (not for the first 
time) since 2005 and suffered a major reversal 
with the amendments to the 1998 Local 
Government Act that were passed in early 2010. 
By contrast Kenya has historically been a highly 
centralised state. However, there is some pros-
pect of greater decentralisation (domestically 
driven) as a result of the new constitution 
expected in 2010. 
The evidence collected by the case studies 
suggests that, in Kenya at least, greater effi-
ciency in the delivery of extension services could 
be achieved through decentralisation. This 
assumes that local agents – ideally the current 
stakeholder fora, reconstituted as advisory 
committees to the district administration – are 
empowered to shape the budget and priorities 
for agricultural and rural development service 
provision in their areas. Greater local control 
could then lead to a better fit with local needs, 
recognising the considerable agro-ecological 
diversity within the country6. A single local 
budget could correct the current imbalance in 
resource allocation both across “ministries” – 
even if the proliferation of ministries remains in 
Nairobi – and across budget lines – leading to 
a greater proportion of staff being field-based, 
but also adequately equipped with transport. 
In theory, there could also be greater local input 
into the monitoring and rewarding of staff 
performance, although this is controversial and 
would not be an automatic part of decentralisa-
tion reform7. 
However, a big question with decentralisation 
is whether the national political elite is suffi-
ciently committed to it to make it work. The 
ownership of the decentralisation programme 
by the Malawian elite has always been question-
able. Two long delays in holding local govern-
ment elections (from 1994-2000 and from 2005 
to the present) have occurred because those in 
power have feared that local elections would 
highlight the limited reach of their parties 
around the country (i.e. outside their regional 
heartlands). By contrast, the championing of 
“majimbo” by Prime Minister Raila Odinga in 
Kenya suggests that the policy could one day 
have sufficient local ownership to be imple-
mented fairly wholeheartedly. This could be 
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good news for the budgeting for, and delivery 
of, agricultural and rural development services 
to smallholder producers around the country.
End Notes
1 A partial exception here was the Training and 
Visit extension system, implemented in Kenya 
in the 1980s. However, even the impact of this 
was more than off set, in farmers’ memories, by 
declines in extension staffi  ng that started in 
the second half of this decade.
2 As in many other parts of Kenya, Rachuonyo 
has subsequently been subdivided into 
multiple districts.
3 Over the past decade, several functional 
reviews of the Ministry of Agriculture in 
Malawi, initiated by donors such as World Bank 
or UNDP, have been blocked by ministry 
offi  cials before completion.
4 In Malawi this has been promoted by UNDP, 
which has funded the “communication” 
component of the fertiliser subsidy 
programme, by the World Bank and by NORAD, 
although the latter have now withdrawn (in 
some frustration at lack of progress).
5 Similar reservations were expressed regarding 
the focal area approach promoted by the 
SIDA-funded NALEP project that concentrates 
extension eff ort in one chosen “focal area” 
within a district for a whole year.
6 A striking example of the need for local 
prioritization was observed in Rachuonyo, 
where the striga weed was endemic in maize 
fi elds and required a concerted local strategy 
to eradicate it – something that, up to that 
time, had clearly been lacking.
7 One of the arguments advanced in Malawi for 
reversing some of the decentralisation 
measures to date is that local discretion over 
hiring, fi ring and promotions leads to people 
appointing their own kinsmen to jobs, i.e. 
nepotism and regionalism. However, even if 
this does occur, it is a matter of debate 
whether this is a problem for extension staff . 
Indeed, in Malawi the Ministry of Health is now 
consciously appointing local people to work in 
health centres, an approach pioneered by 
Millennium Villages Project (MVP), apparently 
with positive results. There are many O level 
graduates in villages, who could work as 
extension staff  with additional training.
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